HELLENIC REPUBLIC
MINISTRY OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND TRANSPORT

HELLENIC AIR AND RAIL
SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY
(HARSIA)

HARSIA

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
OF AIRCRAFT I-6564
IN CHARIA OF THE COUNTY OF ILIAS
ON 21ST OF JUNE 2021

06 / 2025

ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

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Accident of aircraft I-6564
in Charia of the County of Ilias
on 21st of June 2021

The Accident Investigation was conducted by the HELLENIC AIR AND RAIL SAFETY INVESTIGATION AUTHORITY (HARSIA), in accordance with:

- **Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention**
- **European Regulation (EU) 996/2010**
- **Hellenic Republic Law 5014/2023**

"According to *Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention of the International Civil Aviation Organization, Regulation (EU) 996/2010 and Hellenic Republic Law 5014/2023, Accidents and Incidents Investigation is not intended to attribute blame or liability. The sole purpose of this Investigation and the findings is to prevent Accidents and Incidents.*

Therefore, the use of this Report for any purpose other than to prevent future Accidents and Incidents could lead to misinterpretations".

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPERATOR	:	PRIVATE
OWNER	:	PRIVATE
MANUFACTURER	:	I.C.P. S.R.L.
MODEL	:	MXP-640 AMIGO S
COUNTRY OF MANUFACTURE	:	ITALY
NATIONALITY	:	ITALIAN
A/C REGISTRATION	:	I-6564
LOCATION OF ACCIDENT	:	CHARIA, ILIAS
DATE & TIME	:	21/06/2021 at 12:05 p.m.
Note	:	All times are local (LT = UTC + 3h)

SUMMARY

On 21/06/2021, the private Ultra-Light aircraft with registration I-6564 (**Photo 1**), with two passengers on board, during a private flight from the Messolonghi Landing Field to the Pineios Dam – Karatoula – Pyrgos of Ilias – Amaliada and return to the Messolonghi Landing Field, crashed at the village of Charia (**Photo 2**) at 12:05 p.m., 9 km northeast of the town of Pyrgos of Ilias.

The former Air Accident Investigation and Aviation Safety Board and now the Hellenic Air and Rail Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA), was informed of the accident and an investigation team was appointed with the number AAIASB/1361/28.06.2021 document. On 06 July 2021, a notification was sent to the international aviation authorities (Notification to International Authorities) and accredited representatives (ACCREPS) were appointed.

1 FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 History of flight

On 21/06/2021 at 11:16 a.m., the pilot of the private Ultra-Light aircraft with registration I-6564 **(Photo 1)**, contacted the airport approach of Andravida and reported that it took off 3 minutes ago from the Messolonghi Landing Field, is located at 1300 ft above Tourlida in Messolonghi, its route would be Pineios Dam - Karatoula - Pyrgos Ilias - Amaliada and return to the Messolonghi Landing Field, with a flight duration of approximately 2.5 hours.



Photo 1: The MXP-640 AMIGOS S aircraft with registration I-6564

Then the Approach of the Andravida airport asked the pilot to make a call when he would be at Pyrgos Ilias and at an altitude of 2000 ft.

At 11:17:49, the Approach of Andravida airport asked the pilot to make a call in 30 minutes for 'Normal operation'.

At 11:46:20, the pilot called the Approach of Andravida airport stating, 'Normal operation' and that he was at 1500 ft and approaching Karatoula.

Then the Approach of Andravida airport asked the pilot to make a call when he would be at Pyrgos Ilias, and a confirmation followed from the pilot.

At 12:13:07 and 12:13:14, the Approach of Andravida airport called the aircraft without receiving any response from the pilot.

At 12:05 p.m., eyewitnesses reported that they saw the aircraft high banked and while the engine could be heard running, with a noise somewhat different from normal, the aircraft crashed uncontrollably into a house yard in the village of Charia, Ilias (**Photos 2 and 3**), with coordinates 37° 43.919΄N, 21° 30.863΄E and at an altitude of 137 ft.

Photo 2: Map with the aircraft's flight plan and crash site

Eyewitnesses did not notice smoke coming from the aircraft while it was flying, nor did they see any parachute deployed.

Police Officers from Pyrgos Police Station, T.T. Pyrgos and also Officers from Pyrgos Fire Brigade attended the scene of the accident to rescue the passengers and extinguish the fire caused by the crash of the aircraft.

The village where the aircraft crashed is the home of the pilot and is located in a hilly area.



Photo 3: Crash site in the village of Charia, Ilias

1.2 Injuries to persons

Injuries	Crew	Passengers	Others
Fatal	1	1	0
Serious	0	0	0
Mild / None	0	0	0

1.3 Damage to aircraft

The aircraft was completely destroyed and, due to the fire caused by the fuel leak after its crash, was burned with the exception of its tail section.((**Photo 4**).

Photo 4: Debris of the aircraft at the crash site

1.4 Other damage

No significant damage or injury to third parties was caused.

1.5 Crew information

The pilot was a 59-year-old man.

License : Ultralight Aircraft (UL 3 Axis) with number A.M. 0640, valid until 29/08/2021 and initial issue on 29/08/2016.

Medical Certificate: Class 2 valid until 07/08/2021 and LAPL valid until 07/08/2022.

Flight Experience : 269:25 hours until 21/06/2021 (55:10 hours for obtaining the license and 214:15 hours after obtaining it). The 214:15 flight hours were on the aircraft MXP-640 AMIGO S.

He also held a Limited Radiotelephony License with no. GR-006663, valid until 26/03/2024.

1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 General

The aircraft had the following certificates and permits:

Registration Certificate : Number I-6564 with issue date 22/01/2002.

Permit to Flight : Issue date 11/05/2016 with no expiration date. The above permit ceases to be valid in the event of a change of owner and when the aircraft has undergone a modification that changes its flight characteristics.

Station License : Not found.

The aircraft was insured until 15/02/2022.

1.6.2 Aircraft

Manufacturer	: I.C.P. S.R.L.
Type	: MXP-640 AMIGO S
Year of manufacture	: 2000
Date of first flight	: 2002
Maximum Takeoff Mass (MTOM)	: 450 Kg

Total hours of aircraft since manufacture : 670:15

Construction : Two-seaters

The aircraft was equipped with a ballistic parachute, a safety device that is permanently fitted to ultralight aircraft and is used for the safe landing of the aircraft and passengers as a whole. The use of the ballistic parachute must be done with the engine not running.

1.6.3 Engine

Manufacturer : BOMBARDIER ROTAX

Type : 912 TURBO

Power : 120 CV

Total operating hours since manufacture : 670:15

1.6.4 Aircraft Maintenance

The aircraft maintenance schedule includes the following inspections:

Every 25 flight hours.

// 50 flight hours.

// 100 flight hours or every 6 months.

// 200 flight hours or every year.

// 1000 flight hours.

According to the aircraft's Technical Logbook, the last 100-hour inspection was performed on 07/09/2019 with a total of 610:20 hours since manufacture. Also, on 07/09/2019, the fuel filter and spark plugs mentioned in the 200-hour or every year inspection were replaced.

The aircraft, from the last inspection until the day of the accident, i.e. in a period of 1 year and 9.5 months, made 59:55 flight hours.

The owner of the aircraft has the sole responsibility for maintaining the airworthiness of the aircraft after the initial inspection carried out by the manufacture inspector. He has the obligation to diligently carry out the inspections of the aircraft as provided for in the relevant manuals, to record the aircraft's flight hours and everything related to the inspections carried out in the aircraft's Technical Logbook.

1.7 Meteorological information

According to the METAR received for the specific day and at around 12:05 p.m. local time, the weather conditions prevailing in the area were, atmospheric pressure 1011.9 hPa, temperature 29.6 °C, dew point 21.2 °C, relative humidity 60 %, wind direction 320°, wind speed 4 knots, with visibility 10 Km and no clouds below 5000 ft.

1.8 Navigational aids

Not applicable.

1.9 Communications

The pilot's communication with the ATC was carried out without any problems.

1.10 Airport information

Not applicable.

1.11 Flight data recorders

Not applicable.

1.12 Wreckage and impact information

A check of the aircraft wreckage (**Photo 5**), revealed that:

Photo 5: Aircraft wreckage in the storage area (Dhekelia Airport)

a) No discontinuity was observed in the connection of the rudder to the rudder pedals. The cables were found to be in good condition throughout their entire route, as were the end connections both at the height of the Rudder (**Photo 6**) and at the height of the Rudder Pedals (**Photo 7**).

Photo 6: End connections of the Rudder

Photo 7: End connections of the Rudder Pedals

b) There was no problem with the connection of the elevator at the top of the elevator. The cable was found in good condition, as was its end connector. The bracket of the elevator that is connected to the end connector of the cable was found deformed due to the impact **(Photo 8)**. The bracket at the bottom of the elevator that is connected to the end connector of the cable was found detached due to the impact. The rivet holes were found with cracks and deformed due to the loads they received after the deformation of the aircraft fuselage. The cable and its end connector were found in good condition (**Photos 9 and 10**).

Also, no discontinuity was observed in the connection of the control stick to the elevator at the height of the control stick (**Photo 11**), where the cables and their end connections were found to be in good condition. Also, the elevator cables were found to be in good condition throughout their entire route.

Photo 8: Elevator end connection upper surface



Photo 9: Detached elevator bracket lower surface

Photo 10: Elevator end connection lower surface

Photo 11 : Elevator end connections at the height of the control stick

c) The trim tab LH Elevator (**Photo 12**) was found to be discontinuous at the height of the trim tab due to a fracture of the rod body, which also shows deformation. The fracture surface has characteristics of a static fracture due to impact. The bracket on the trim tab connected to the 'Rod Body' end connector was also found to be deformed due to the impact.

Photo 12: Trim Tab Elevator Connection

d) The connection of the longitudinal rod to the control stick and the transverse rods that transfer the movement from the control stick to the ailerons were found to be in good condition (**Photo 13**).

Photo 13: Connection of the Ailerons

Discontinuity is observed in the connection of the left transverse rod with the left aileron at the height of the crank (Bellcrank), due to the impact and the fire that followed (**Photos 14, 15**). The connection of the arm that connects the 'Aileron' with the 'Bellcrank' was found in good condition on the left 'Aileron' (**Photo 15**).

Photo 14: Left Aileron and Flap transverse rods

Photo 15: Left Aileron and Flap

Discontinuity is also observed in the connection of the right transverse rod to the right aileron at the height of the bellcrank, due to the impact and the fire that followed (**Photos 16, 17**). The connection of the arm connecting the aileron to the bellcrank was found in good condition on the right aileron **(photo 17)**.

Photo 16: Right aileron and flap transverse rods

Photo 17: Right aileron and flap

e) The transverse rods of the flaps and their connections at the height of the fuselage were found to be in good condition (**Photo 18**). Discontinuity is observed in the connection of the left transverse rod with the left flap at the height of the bellcrank, due to the impact and the fire that followed (**Photo 14**). The connection of the arm that connects the left flap to the bellcrank was found to be in good condition (**Photos 14, 19**).

Discontinuity is observed in the connection of the right transverse rod with the right flap at the height of the bellcrank, due to the impact and the fire that followed (**Photo 16**). The connection of the arm that connects the right flap to the bellcrank was found to be in good condition (**Photos 16, 20**).

Photo 18: The transverse rods connecting the flaps

Photo 19: Arm connection with the left flap

Photo 20: Arm connection with the right flap

f) The front section of the aircraft's fuselage was completely burned, up to the height of the flaps, without anything related to the ballistic parachute being able to be identified (**Photo 4, 21**).

Photo 21: The burnt fuselage of the aircraft

1.13 Medical and pathological information

According to the forensic examination:

a) The death of the pilot occurred as a result of head, chest, abdomen and limb injuries - carbonization of the body. During the toxicological examination for the detection of alcohol, hallucinogenic / paraesthetic substances, stimulants / depressants and opiates, the result of the examination was negative, with the exception of the result of the blood alcohol test which was positive (0.32 g/lt), as was also the result of the bile alcohol test. According to national and European legislation, the maximum permissible alcohol limit in the body for the pilot is 0.20 g/lt measured by the blood sampling method. Also, according to the national regulation for the Civil Aviation Ultralight, the pilot is not allowed to start the flight if he has consumed alcohol in the last 24 hours.

b) The death of the second passenger occurred as a result of head, chest and limb injuries - carbonization of the body. During the toxicological examination for the detection of alcohol, hallucinogenic / paraesthetic substances, stimulants / depressants and opiates, the result of the examination was negative. The result of the blood alcohol test was 0.20 g/lt, and the result of the bile alcohol test was negative.

In a question asked to the Forensic Medical Service, we received the answer that the carbonization of the bodies does not contribute to an increase in the amount of alcohol detected in the blood.

1.14 Fire

The impact of the aircraft with the ground caused a fuel leak and then a fire.

1.15 Survival aspects

Not applicable.

1.16 Tests and research

Not applicable.

1.17 Organizational and management information

Not applicable.

1.18 Additional information

Not applicable

1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques

Not applicable

2 ANALYSIS

1) According to the legislation, the pilot had all the required licenses/certificates valid to perform the flight, an ultralight aircraft pilot license, a Medical Certificate and a Limited Radiotelephony License.

2) The aircraft had followed: a) its prescribed certification procedure, b) it had not undergone any modification that would alter its initial flight characteristics, c) no Airworthiness Directive was found to have been issued that affects the specific type of aircraft.

3) The owner of the aircraft had the sole responsibility for maintaining the airworthiness of the aircraft after the initial inspection carried out by the manufacture inspector. He was also obliged to diligently carry out the inspections of the aircraft as provided for in the relevant manuals and to record them in the Technical Log Book.

The aircraft, from the last inspection until the day of the accident, had flown 59:55 hours, over a period of 1 year and 9.5 months. According to its maintenance program, over a period of 1 year and 9.5 months it should have carried out the inspections of 25 flight hours, 50 flight hours, 100 flight hours or every 6 months and 200 flight hours or every year. There are no entries in the Technical Log Book for the above-mentioned inspections that should have been carried out. Therefore, its maintenance was not carried out as provided for in the relevant manufacturer's manual and the pilot should not have flown with the specific aircraft.

4) In the Technical Logbook of the aircraft there was no mention of any technical problem after the flight that could have contributed to the accident.

5) The prevailing weather conditions in the accident area were good and did not contribute to the accident.

6) During the examination for the detection of alcohol by the blood sampling method on the pilot, the result was positive (0.32 g/lt), as was the result of the examination for alcohol in the bile sample. According to national and European legislation, the maximum permissible limit of alcohol in the body for the pilot is 0.20 g/lt measured by the blood sampling method. In a question asked to the Forensic Medical Service, we received the answer that the carbonization of the bodies does not contribute to an increase in the amount of alcohol detected in the blood. Also, according to the national

regulation for the Civil Aviation Ultralight aircraft, the pilot is not allowed to start the flight if he has consumed alcohol in the last 24 hours.

Taking into account the detection of alcohol in the pilot in a quantity greater than the permitted limit, the pilot should not have started the flight, since the presence of alcohol in his body could contribute to the reduction of his abilities.

Furthermore, during the examination no hallucinogenic / paraesthetic substances, stimulants / depressants and opiates were observed.

7) From the results of the examination conducted by the Forensic Medical Service, it appears that the pilot's death did not occur due to any pathological cause, but as a result of head, chest, abdomen and limb injuries - carbonization due to the impact of the aircraft on the ground.

8) According to eyewitness testimony, the aircraft's engine was operating until the impact with the ground, with its noise sounding somewhat different from normal, without its irregular operation being confirmed, and no smoke was observed coming from the aircraft until the impact with the ground.

Also, from the inspection carried out on the aircraft's flight controls, it does not appear that there was any problem in their operation, since any discontinuities found were a result of the impact and the fire that followed.

From the above, it appears that the engine provided thrust, even if it was not the intended one, and since the pilot did not have any problem with the aircraft's flight controls, he was able to put the aircraft into a controlled descent and attempt an emergency landing in an area with the fewest obstacles and away from a populated area. Instead, the aircraft crashed into an area with houses and many large trees, and at the highest point of the slope, when it could have taken advantage of the slope to stay in flight longer and attempted a landing at a lower altitude and with fewer obstacles. The above indicates an uncontrolled fall of the aircraft and not an attempt by the pilot to make a forced landing.

9) The aircraft was equipped with a ballistic parachute, a safety device that is permanently attached to ultralight aircraft and is used for the safe landing of an aircraft and passengers as a whole, with the use of the ballistic parachute having to be done with the engine not running.

Since the aircraft had a ballistic parachute, the pilot could have activated it in the event of a loss of engine power, which he did not do. This is also an indication that the pilot had engine power and was executing a maneuver, since they saw the aircraft moving at a high bank, losing control due to stall and attempting to recover, believing that he could achieve it.

3 CONCLUSIONS

3.1 Findings

3.1.1 The aircraft had followed: a) its prescribed certification procedure, b) it had not undergone any modification that would alter its original flight characteristics, c) no Airworthiness Directive affecting the specific type of aircraft was found to have been issued.

3.1.2 There was no entry in the aircraft Technical Logbook for the existence of any technical problem.

3.1.3 No problem was found in the operation of the aircraft's flight controls.

3.1.4 The prescribed maintenance inspections had not been performed on the aircraft, resulting in the loss of its airworthiness, although this does not appear to have contributed to the accident. Maintaining the airworthiness of the aircraft is the sole responsibility of the aircraft owner.

3.1.5 The aircraft engine was operating at the time of impact with the ground, without it being possible to confirm whether it was providing the adequate thrust.

3.1.6 The pilot had all the required licenses/certificates for the flight, a ultralight pilot license, a Medical Certificate and a Limited Radiotelephony License.

3.1.7 No hallucinogenic / paraesthetic substances, stimulants / depressants and opiates were observed to the pilot.

3.1.8 The result of the pilot's blood alcohol test was positive (0.32 g/lt). The pilot should not have started the flight, since the presence of alcohol in his body could contribute to the reduction of his abilities.

3.1.9 The death of the pilot occurred as a result of injuries sustained due to impact of aircraft on the ground and not from pathological causes.

3.1.10 The prevailing weather conditions in the area of the accident were good and did not contribute to the accident.

3.1.11 The point at which the aircraft crashed on the ground does not indicate an attempt by the pilot to make a forced landing.

3.1.12 The aircraft was equipped with a ballistic parachute which the pilot did not deploy.

3.1.13 The non-use of the ballistic parachute, as well as the point at which the aircraft crashed on the ground, indicate an attempt by the pilot to regain control of the aircraft, having power to the engine.

3.2 Possible Causes

The aircraft stall during the maneuver.

3.3 Contributing Factors

Flight in a hilly area resulting in the aircraft's height above the ground varying.

4 SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Not applicable.

Nea Filadelphia,03rd of November 2025

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